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INTRODUCTION

The oil crisis of the 1970's forced the United States to reduce its
dependence on fossil fuels. As a result, public interest and investment' increased in alternative energy sources 2 such as cogenert Member, Minnesota Bar. Mr. Colton received his B.A. degree from Middlebury
College in 1978 and his J.D. from William Mitchell College of Law in 1982. He is currently an associate with the St. Paul law firm of Maun, Green, Hayes, Simon, Johanneson
& Brehl.
tt Member, Minnesota Bar. Mr. Brehl received his B.S. degree from the University
of Notre Dame in 1956 and his LL.B. from the University of Michigan Law School in
1969. He is currently a partner in the St. Paul law firm of Maun, Green, Hayes, Simon,
Johanneson & Brehl and represents various utilities and small power producers before the
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.
1. See Diamond, Cogenerationjarsthe Power Industry, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1984, § 3, at
28, col. 3. "It was only after the skyrocketing fuel prices of the 1970's began to cut into
profits that industry began to investigate the virtues of conservation and cogeneration."
Id
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ators3 and small power production facilities. 4 Currently five
percent of all electricity used in the United States comes from
cogeneration. 5 Commentators predict that cogeneration will produce fifteen percent of the nation's power by the year 2000.6 In
Minnesota, the target supply for alternative energy development is
expected to reach forty percent of end use demand by the end of
the century. 7 New tax credits have benefited cogeneration and
small power production facilities,8 but use of these alternative energy sources has only recently become economically viable.
Public utility laws prevent nonutility generating facilities such
as cogeneration plants from directly retailing their excess power.
Complicated public utility regulatory and ratemaking laws and
the necessity of obtaining the required public franchises make
cogeneration and distribution of power difficult. 9 In addition,
2. Alternative energy sources include solar energy, hydroelectric energy, wind energy, geothermal energy, and biomass or waste energy. See Huss, Richmond & Badger,
Alternative Generation Technologies. Can They Compete?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 15, 1984, at 17
(study of 14 alternative generation technologies).
3. Cogeneration is the concurrent production of any two forms of energy, most commonly electricity and process steam. Useful heat and power are produced together "by
the sequential use of energy from one fuel source-the reject heat of one process becomes
the energy input into a subsequent process." RESOURCE DYNAMICS CORPORATION,
STATE RULEMAKING AND UTILITY PRICING FOR COGENERATION I (1983); see also Cross,
Cogeneration: Its Potential and Incentives for Development, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 236, 236 &
n.2 (1979) (cogeneration conserves energy by increasing fuel-use efficiency); Diamond,
supra note 1, at I (discussing the increased use of cogeneration by industries).
4. Small power production facilities are small facilities which employ renewable resources such as solar energy, hydroelectric energy, wind energy, geothermal energy, or
biomass or waste as a primary fuel. Hamilton, Standard Contracts and Pricesfor Small Power
Producers, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 421 (1985).
5. Diamond, supra note 1, at I. Diamond predicts that cogeneration will produce
seven percent of the nation's electricity in 1984. Cogeneration is also likely to provide "a
significant part of our electric power in the future." Id.
6. Id. This amount of power is enough to meet the needs of all of New England,
including New York. This is more than is currently produced from nuclear power. Id.
7. 3 MINNESOTA ENERGY AGENCY, MINNESOTA ENERGY REVIEW, DRAFT 1980
ENERGY POLICY AND CONSERVATION REPORT 10 (executive summary 1980). A breakdown of the targets of various alternative energy resources is as follows: direct solar energy---8.5%; wind-2.1%; hydro-0.4%; crop residues-6.5%; animal wastes-0.3%;
special energy crops including peat-7.9%; urban wastes-0.4%; and district heating4.2%. Id "These alternatives could replace 70% of our heating fuel oils, 30% of our gasoline and 39% of our conventional electricity generated by 2000." Id.
8. The Energy Tax Act of 1978 provided business and residential tax credits for
investments in solar and wind properties. Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 44C (1982)). The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 expanded
the amounts of those credits and lengthened the list of eligible properties to include certain
solar, hydropower, and cogeneration projects. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229, 230-56
(1980) (codified at 26 U.S.C. ch. 45 (1982)).
9. N. DEAN, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN INDUSTRY 132, 178-82 (1980). A public utility
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some electric utilities are unwilling to encourage the development
of competing energy alternatives.' 0 Until recently, even if a
cogenerator which produced significant quantities of power did
manage to sell its excess capacity to a utility, the cogenerator remained generally captive to one particular electric utility and, in
some cases, subject to utility-dictated price terms.'' This reluctance on the part of the utilities to purchase power from the
smaller facilities continued to discourage development of cogeneration and renewable energy sources.
In an effort to overcome these difficulties and encourage the use
of alternative power sources, Congress passed the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).' 2 Section 210 of
PURPA, and the regulations of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) implementing PURPA 13 provide the means
for cogenerators and small power producers to put their excess
power to use.' 4 In 1981, the Minnesota Legislature adopted the
must acquire a certificate of public convenience and necessity before construction of its
first plant and is subject to rate regulation, a duty to serve new customers, the inability to
discontinue service to a customer without approval of the local Public Utility Commission,
restrictions on sales of securities, and a duty to file accounts and reports. Id.at 179-82; see
also Cogeneration.-Regulation and Economics, 2 WM. MITCHELL ENVTL. L.J. 89, 104-05 (1984)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Cogeneration].
With the advent of the energy crisis, alternatives to the conventional sources of energy
were explored. The established electric utilities had created several institutional barriers
to the development of any alternatives. One of these barriers was the regulatory system.
Id.at 100.
10. See Diamond, supra note 1,at 1. One problem is that the utilities do not want to
purchase alternative energy power because only small quantities are yielded. Id.
11. See Gentry, Pubhc Utility
ParticipationIn Decentralzed Power Production, 5 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 316 (1981). Additional examples of cogeneration captiveness "include refusal to interconnect, refusal to allow back-feed of electricity into the utility grid,
overly complex regulations governing parallel operations, [and] refusal to 'wheel' power
across their lines .... ." Id (footnotes omitted).
12. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 311773 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1982)). The broad purpose of PURPA is to encourage the conservation of energy and the efficient use of energy resources. 16 U.S.C.
§ 2611 (1982); seeL. BUCK & L. GOODWIN, ALTERNATIVE ENERGY: THE FEDERAL ROLE
§ 7 (1982); Cogeneraton, supra note 9, at 105.
13. 18 C.F.R. § 292 (1984); see 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3( (1982).
14. PURPA relieves qualifying facilities (QFs) from treatment as public utilities and
provides for interconnection to public utility systems. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982). PURPA
also requires the purchase of excess power by the connecting public utility or the "wheeling" of that power by the utility to another purchasing utility. This legislation assures the
interconnected QF that necessary supportive back-up and emergency power will be supplied by the utility. Id
Although PURPA and its regulations fail to permit a QF to make sales for purposes
other than resale, Id § 824a-3(a), they do provide a market for excess power generated by
QFs. PURPA requires that the purchase rate be "just and reasonable to the electric con-
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Minnesota Cogeneration and Small Power Production Act
(MCSPPA) to implement PURPA and the FERC rules. 15 The
Minnesota Legislature stated MCSPPA's purpose more forcefully
than Congress did in section 2601 of PURPA: MCSPPA is insumers of the electric utility and in the public interest" and not "discriminate against
qualifying facilities." Id § 824a-3(b). More specifically, PURPA mandates that the rates
set by the FERC rules not exceed the incremental cost to the utility of alternative electric
energy. Id. Incremental costs are the costs to the electric utility of the energy which, but
for the purchase from the QF, the utility would generate or purchase from another source.
Id.§ 834a-3(d). Applying marginal cost principles, the upper limit of purchase rate equals
the cost of the next unit or units of power which the utility would be required to produce
or buy from other sources in the absence of the QF's power.
PURPA provided the framework for FERC to adopt rules to encourage cogeneration
and small power production, and for states to implement PURPA and the FERC rules.
See Crespi, MarginalCost-of-Service Studies: Some Practical Diftiulties, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec.
4, 1980, at 19; Radford, MarginalCost Pricing Considered in Recent Electric Rate Cases, PuB.
UTIL. FORT., Oct. 9, 1980, at 49. As a result of PURPA, the technology of cogeneration
and small power production progressed.
15. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 237, 1981 Minn. Laws 1022-24 (codified at MINN. STAT.
ch. 216B (Supp. 1983)). The Minnesota Legislature recognized the immediate interest in
small farm and homestead power production units. Thus, the MCSPPA focuses on QFs
having less than 40 kW, and provides those customers certain benefits. MINN. STAT.
§ 216B.164, subd. 3 (Supp. 1983).
On March 7, 1983, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission adopted rules (MPUC
rules) to implement the MCSPPA as adopted in 1981. In re Proposed Adoption of Rules
of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Governing Cogeneration and Small Power
Production, Order Adopting Rules, No. E-999/R-80-560 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n Mar.
7, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Mar. 1983 Order Adopting Rules]. The MCSPPA was revised in 1983. Act of June 8, 1983, ch. 301, 1983 Minn. Laws 166-71 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 216B. 164, subds. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 (Supp. 1983)). When the amendments became
effective on August 1, 1983, the MPUC adopted temporary rules to implement the 1983
revisions of the MCSPPA. In re Adoption of Temporary Rules Governing Cogeneration
and Small Power Production (amending 4 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. pts. 3.0450-3.0462
(1982)), Order Adopting Temporary Rules, No. G,E-999/R-83-376 (Minn. Pub. Util.
Comm'n Oct. 18, 1983).
In June of 1984, the MPUC issued a Notice and Order for Hearing to begin the
administrative procedure for adopting permanent rules under MCSPPA. In re Proposed
Amendments to the Rules of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Governing
Cogeneration and Small Power Production, Notice and Order for Hearing, No. E-999/R84-105 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n June 15, 1984). In mid-September, the Hearing Examiner's office issued its report. In re Proposed Amendments to the Rules of the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission Governing Cogeneration and Small Power Production, Report of the Administrative Law Judge, No. PUC-84-078-BC, E-999/R-84-105 (Minn. Office of Admin. Hearings Sept. 13, 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Report of
Administrative Law Judge]. The MPUC Order accepted the recommendations of the
judge and permanent rules implementing the 1983 statutory amendments were adopted
on October 16, 1984. In re Proposed Adoption of Amendments to the Rules of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Governing Cogeneration and Small Power Production,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Adopting Rules, No. E999/R-84-105
(Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n Oct. 16, 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Order Adopting
Amended Rules].
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tended "to give the maximum possible encouragement to cogeneration and small power production consistent with protection of the
ratepayers and the public."' 16 Uniform buy-back and purchase
rate measures now require all Minnesota utilities, 17 including cooperatives and municipal electric companies,' to buy cogenerators' excess power and feed it back into the system. 19
The MCSPPA affects not only cogenerators and small power
producers, but also the public utilities,20 their ratepayers and inMINN. STAT. § 216B.164(1) (!982).
17. Public utility means "persons, corporations or other legal entities . . .operating,
maintaining, or controlling in this state equipment or facilities for furnishing at retail
natural, manufactured or mixed gas or electric service to or for the public or engaged in
the production and retail sale thereof." MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 2 (Supp. 1983).
18. The original 1981 Minnesota legislation subjected cooperatives and municipals to
the cogeneration and small power production provisions only when an interconnection
with a QF already existed. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 237, § 1, subd. 2, 1981 Minn. Laws
1023 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 216B. 164, subd. 2 (Supp. 1983)). Except in specific situations or upon petition, cooperative and municipal utilities are deemed to be self-regulating
since they are owned and operated by their customers, their members or their citizens. See
MINN. STAT. §216B.01 (1982). In 1983, the Minnesota Legislature amended the
MCSPPA to make it and the MPUC rules apply to cooperatives and municipals, without
regard to whether an interconnection had yet been made. Act of June 8, 1983, ch. 301,
§ 166, 1983 Minn. Laws 1678 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 216B. 164, subd. 2 (Supp. 1983)).
The 1983 amendment did, however, permit municipals the opportunity to remain selfgoverning and free of MPUC control by allowing municipals to adopt their own cogeneration and small power production rules. These rules, however, must be consistent with the
§ 171, subd. 9 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 9 (Supp.
MPUC rules. Steid.
1983)).
19. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 8 (Supp. 1983).
20. Testimony of QF owners revealed their perception that many utilities have discouraged interconnection of QFs. In the initial MPUC rules hearings in 1982, 134 public
witnesses appeared and 119 written exhibits were received from members of the public. In
re Proposed Adoption of New Rules of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Governing Cogeneration and Small Power Production, Report of the Hearing Examiner, No.
PUC-82-063-BC, I (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n Dec. 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982
Report of Hearing Examiner]. This report is 76 pages long and includes findings and
conclusions derived from thousands of pages of exhibits and transcripts. The testimony
includes repeated references to the public perception that utilities resisted the interconnection of small QFs, particularly wind generators. See, e.g., id at 36 (utilities use unreasonable insurance requirements to discourage cogenerators and small producers). The utilities
stated that they supported rules encouraging development of alternative energy sources,
but that the proposed rules granted undue preferential treatment to QFs. See In re Proposed Adoption of Rules of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Governing
Cogeneration and Small Power Production, Comments of Northern States Power Company, No. E-999/R-80-560, PUC-82-063-BC, at I (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n July 1982);
In re Proposed Rules Governing Cogeneration and Small Power Production, Testimony of
Dennis R. Eicher, Vice-President, Power System Engineering, Inc., on behalf of the Minnesota Rural Electric Association, No. E-999/R-80-560, at 2 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n
May 1, 1982). Mr. Eicher testified that the Association was in general agreement with the
proposed rules, but that the Association had several concerns. The Association demanded

16.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 6
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I11

vestors, and the regulations in every jurisdiction within which each
utility operates. 21 The competing interests of all parties must be
accomodated, while serving the basic power conservation purposes
of PURPA. 22 The MCSPPA distinguishes between qualifying facilities (QFs) 23 of less than forty kilowatts and those of greater capromulgation of adequate safety standards and requirements to insure safe interconnections with QFs, QF output characteristics sufficient to maintain quality service to other
member-consumers, and incentive payments not to exceed the true avoided cost so that
other member rate-payers are not forced to subsidize the QFs. Id see also In re Proposed
Adoption of Rules of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Governing Cogeneration
and Small Power Production, Preliminary Statement of the Minnesota Municipal Utilities Association, No. E-999/R-80-560, PUC-82-063-BC, at 2 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n
Sept. 7, 1982) (assertion that proposed rules, absent revisions, do not meet the substantive
standards required of agency rulemaking).
Since most, if not all, of the QFs represented in the hearings were "small" power
producers, it is evident that utilities in general have not as yet fully taken into account the
statutory policy or the limited impact of each QF upon the utility system. In extreme
cases, utilities have demanded a FERC order prior to interconnection. See American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1921, 1931-32 (1983) (upholding
FERC rule requiring utilities to interconnect without an individual FERC order upon
each application for interconnection). Minnesota statutory law requires each utility to
interconnect with any QF offering to provide energy. Act of June 8, 1983, ch. 301, § 170,
1983 Minn. Laws 1558, 1680 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 8(a)
(Supp. 1983)). Conceivably, arguments of preemption by the federal legislation may still
be raised, but utilities covered by the Minnesota statute are directly and specifically required to interconnect. Id
21. See MINN. STAT. § 216B. 164, subd. 2 (Supp. 1983); see also 16 U.S.C. § 2601
(1982). PURPA defines an electric utility broadly as "any person, State agency, or Federal agency, which sells electric energy." Id § 2602, subd. 4.
22. The interests of both the small facilities and the ratepaying public are taken into
account by the state and federal legislation. Although some utilities still resist interconnection, see supra note 20, small power production and cogeneration are clearly encouraged. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 1 (1982). The MCSPPA states even more
emphatically than PURPA that Minnesota's policy is to provide the "maximum possible
encouragement." Id. Balanced against this incentive, however, is the legislative requirement that the program be "consistent with protection of the ratepayers and the public."
Id. PURPA and FEIC also carefully provide that the rates for purchase from the QF
must be "just and reasonable" to the utility ratepayer and "in the public interest." 16
U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(l); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(1)(i). To facilitate encouragement of cogeneration and take the ratepayers' interests into account, the QF is treated as a vendor of
power to the utility as is any other wholesaler of power or provider of fuel whose terms of
sale to the utility are not directly regulated in the normal regulatory process. By way of
contrast, when the utility offers to purchase power from the QF, or provides power to the
QF for back-up emergency or other purposes, the utility must not "discriminate" against
the QF, a more rigorous test. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b), (c); 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.304(a)(1)(ii),
.305(a)(l)(ii). In other words, the utility must deal with the QF on a nondiscriminatory
basis, as with other ratepayers. 1982 Report of Hearing Examiner for New Rules, supra
note 20, at 11. The foregoing rules are particularly necessary for the small QF, because
not having the means to bargain with the utility, it relies on fair dealing by the utility and
on the regulatory process for protection.
23. The term "qualifying facility" includes both cogeneration facilities and small
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pacity. 24 It provides a simplified and standarized approach to
dealing with the smaller facilities. QFs of forty kilowatts or more
are not so favored and generally are left to their own resources and
ingenuity when dealing with the applicable broadly stated standards of the MCSPPA. 25 Since 1980, the MSCPPA and the rules
of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (MPUC rules) have
26
made it easier for small QFs to interconnect with utilities.
This Article addresses the issues faced by an under-forty kilowatt QF in Minnesota seeking to interconnect with a utility under
the MCSPPA. Provisions of the MCSPPA and the MPUC rules
power production facilities. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(1) (1984). State laws and regulations
arising from PURPA follow this definition. See, e.g., MINN. R. pt. 7835.0100, subp. 19
(1983). A "cogeneration facility" is a facility that produces both electric energy and
steam, heat, or some other form of useful energy. 16 U.S.C. § 796, subd. 18(a) (1982). A
"small power production facility," on the other hand, is a facility that produces electrical
power from biomass, waste, geothermal resources, or renewable resources such as wind,
water, or solar energy, or any combination thereof, and has a production capacity of not
more than 80 megawatts. Id § 796, subd. 17(a). Cogeneration and small power production facilities meeting the requirements of PURPA are frequently referred to as "qualifying facilities," a phrase which masks the operating distinctions between the two types of
facilities. Since the rules, however, apply to both forms of power generation, this Article
refers to "qualifying facilities" or "QFs."
24. See MINN. STAT. § 216B. 164, subds. 3-4 (1982 & Supp. 1983). Only QFs of less
than 40 kW have the option of net energy billing by electing a purchase rate fixed by
reference to the "average retail energy rate." Id § 216B. 164, subd. 3(c) (Supp. 1983). QFs
of less than 40 kW also have the benefit of the uniform statewide contract. Act of June 8,
1983, ch. 301, § 169, 1983 Minn. Laws 1678-79 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 216B.164,
subd. 6 (Supp. 1983)); see also MINN. R. pts. 7835.6100, .9910 (Supp. 1984). Minnesota
Rules pt. 7835.3200 provides that standard rates apply to QFs of 100 kW or less. MINN.
R. pt. 7835.3200 (Supp. 1984). QFs of 40 kW and more as a result must deal with the
complicated determinaton of "full avoided cost" under the purchase rate approach.
25. See supra notes 15, 25. See generally Hamilton, supra note 4, at 431-33.
26. In providing service to the QF, the utility must not discriminate when discontinuing or reconnecting service. MINN. R. pt. 7835.2800 (1983) (discontinuance may occur
during a system emergency). The utility must provide maintenance and uninterrupted,
supplementary, and back-up power to the QF. Id pt. 7835.2600. The circumstances
under which a utility may discontinue the purchase of power from a QF are primarily
related to safety, construction, repair, and service problems with the quality of power. See
id pt. 7835.5300 (parallel generation may be discontinued for system safety).
Disputes between QFs and utilities, including municipal utilities, may be submitted
directly to the MPUC for resolution. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 5 (Supp. 1983). "In
the event of disputes between an electric utility and a qualifying facility, either party may
request a determination of the issue by the commission. In any such determination, the
burden of proof shall be on the utility." Id.; see also MINN. R. pt. 7835.4500 (1983). The
prevailing party may be awarded its costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees. Such an
award will be made in favor of the utility only when the claims of the QFs are in bad faith
or frivolous. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 5 (1982 & Supp. 1983). The rules also provide that the QF may appeal to the MPUC when it considers the individual technical
requirements of a utility excessive. MINN. R. pt. 7835.5800 (1983).
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which in part benefit small cogenerators are analyzed, including
the uniform statewide contract, billing rate, and attention to fairness. Next, provisions potentially disadvantageous to under-forty
kilowatt cogenerators, such as costs of tariff filings and interconnection and particular clauses in the uniform contract, are discussed. Finally, points that remain open for final resolution,
including exact metering configurations, interconnection plans,
disconnect equipment, and safety and technical standards, are
explored.
II.

SMALL FACILITY CONCERNS

A.

Purchase Rate

The under-forty kilowatt QF encounters a number of problems
when seeking interconnection with a utility in Minnesota. Certainly one of the most obvious and principal concerns is the rate
paid by the utility for power delivered by the QF. FERC rules
interpret the PURPA incremental cost limitation as establishing a
complex avoided cost standard. 2 7 To encourage cogeneration,
utilities must pay the QF their full avoided cost. 28 The method for
27. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304 (1984). The FERC rules require that the price paid by
each utility for electric energy purchased from a QF shall be at a rate equal to the utility's
full avoided cost. Id. Rates below the avoided cost are allowed if the state regulatory
authority determines that the rate is consistent with § 292.304(a) and is sufficient to encourage cogeneration and small power production. Id. § 292.304(b)(3). The rules define
full avoided cost as the cost which the utility, but for the purchase from the QF, would
incur in generating the electricity itself or purchasing the electricity from another source.
Id. § 292.101(a)(6). Thus, the full avoided cost is the incremental cost or marginal cost to
the electrical utility of the next unit of power that it otherwise would be required to generate or purchase. This equals the PURPA upper limit on the price that the utility can be
required to pay.
28. See id § 292.304. But see id. § 292.304(b) (3) (rate may under certain circumstances
be below the avoided cost). Payment at the full avoided cost meets the terms of PURPA
and is important because it provides a significant incentive for the development of
cogeneration and small power production. The full avoided cost rate complies with the
statutory requirement that rates be "just and reasonable to the electric consumers of the
electric utility and in the public interest." American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec.
Power Serv. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1921, 1928-30 (1983) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)
(1982)).
The determination of avoided cost is extremely complicated, beyond the reach of this
Article, and beyond the practical reach of any single cogeneration or small power producer of less than 40 kW capacity. For a detailed discussion of avoided costs, see Hamilton, supra note 4, at 447-63. The FERC and MPUC rules readily display the complexity
of this determination. The authors doubt that it is worth the time and trouble for utilities
to calculate, or rather, estimate an actual avoided cost with respect to the limited numbers
of under-40 kW QFs that now exist. Certainly, if the purchase rate for the small QF were
made only through a complicated avoided cost estimate, the small QF would lack the
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determining this rate, however, puts the QF at a disadvantage.
The QF is forced to rely on information filed by the utility to determine rates. Even assuming the reliability of the utility filing,
the appraisal of the avoided cost determination is beyond the capacity of the typical small QF owner. Despite attempts by the
Minnesota Legislature to simplify the billing procedures, the 1984
revisions of the MPUC rules raise additional concerns.
Prior to 1983, the Minnesota legislation provided for net energy
billing for QFs under forty kilowatts, 29 but failed to specify the
rate to be paid for power purchased by the utility. The MPUC
rules originally provided a purchase rate for QFs of twenty kilowatts or less under net energy billing equal to the lowest block of
retail energy rate charged by the utility to customers of the same
class. 30 For QFs of more than twenty kilowatts but less than forty
kilowatts, the rules fixed the purchase rate by reference to the utility's estimate of avoided cost, or if the utility in its tariff filing did
not include an avoided cost schedule, by reference to the utility's
energy rate schedule.3 1 The MPUC, in adopting the 1983 rules,
found that their determinations provided a fair approximation of
avoided cost. 32 Yet this formulation left QFs between twenty kilo-

watts and forty kilowatts with no assurance of a sufficiently fair,
readily understandable, and verifiable method for determination
of the purchase rate if a utility filed rates using its complex determination of avoided costs.
In 1983 the Minnesota Legislature, recognizing the importance
of simplicity in encouraging maximum small power production,
again addressed the issue. 33 It raised the kilowatt level of small
QFs entitled to the benefit of a purchase rate fixed by reference to
the utility energy rate schedule to those QFs under forty kilowatts. 34

The legislature also adjusted the net energy billing

purchase rate, deemed by the MPUC to be an approximation of
resources to challenge the utility estimate, forcing it to accept whatever the utility offered.
See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2) (1984).
29. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 237, § 1, 1981 MINN. LAws 1022, 1023 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 3 (1982)).
30. 4 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. pt. 3.0456(B)(3)(a) (1982) (recodified as MINN. R. pt.
7835.3300, subp. 3 (1983)).
31. Id. pt. 3.0456(B)(3)(b), .0456(C) (recodified as MINN. R. pts. 7835.3300, subp. 3 &
7835.3400 (1983)).
32. Mar. 1983 Order Adopting Rules, supra note 15, at 56.
33. Act of June 8, 1983, ch. 301, § 167, 1983 MINN. LAws 1678-79 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 3 (1982)).
34. Id § 167(c).
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avoided cost, to the "average" retail energy rate, rather than the
35
lowest block.
Small QFs under forty kilowatts may now elect net energy billing. Net energy billing consists of: (1) a netting out of the amount
of power drawn from or sent to the utility by a QF, and (2) application of either the utility energy rate to the net power drawn from
the utility, or a purchase rate based on net power delivered to the
utility equal to the utility's average retail energy rate3 6 for the particular class of customer involved. 37 Minnesota's net energy billing
approach may not eliminate all controversy over the purchase rate
to be paid to small QFs under forty kilowatts, but it presents a
practical solution for estimation of avoided cost if fairly applied by
the utilities. This approach provides under-forty kilowatt QFs,
rather than the utility, the option of using the net energy billing
rate method.
In 1984, the MPUC departed from the exact terms of the legislative definition of "average retail energy rate" in amending the
rules regarding net energy billing charges to QFs under forty kilowatts. Instead of directly averaging the retail energy rates from
the utility schedules, 38 a method readily verifiable by the small
QF, the MPUC prescribed that each utility must establish its average retail energy rates for each customer class by tariff. These
rates must be equal to "the quotient of the total annual class revenue from sales of electricity minus the annual revenue resulting
from fixed charges, divided by the annual class kilowatt-hour
sales" for the most recent twelve-month period available before
39
each tariff filing.

That change by the MPUC on its face complicates the rate pricing structure and precludes QFs from verifying rates. The QF is
dependent on information filed by the utility in determining the
35. Id. Section 167(c) provides as follows: "[Aiverage retail utility energy rate is defined as the average of the retail energy rates, exclusive of special rates based on income,
age, or energy conservation, according to the applicable rate schedule of the utility for
sales to that class of customer." Id.
36. A utility in its annual cogeneration-small power production tariff includes a calculation of its "average retail utility energy rate" on the basis of its last available 12
months of power sale receipts and the number of units of power sold, less any fixed charges
included in the energy rates. MINN R. pt. 7835.0650 (Supp. 1984). Average retail utility
energy rate is defined in Minnesota Rules pt. 7835.0100, subp. 2(a).
37. 1981 MINN. LAWS ch. 301, § 167 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 216B.164(3) (Supp.
1983)).
38. The direct averaging is exclusive of special rates based on income, age, or energy
conservation. MINN. R. pt. 7835.0100, subp. (2)(a) (Supp. 1984).
39. Id.
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rates, but that information should be readily verifiable in the event
of a dispute, even though verification by the QF will be more
costly and time-consuming. The administrative law judge, and in
turn the MPUC in acting upon the 1984 rules amendments, found
the rules' definition appropriate although deviant from the exact
legislative language. The administrative law judge determined
that the MPUC definition is a fair, reasonable, and legitimate application of state law consistent with the full avoided cost limitation, which avoids federal preemption and attendant
constitutional invalidity. 40 The judge stated that "the monthly
service charge and demand charge are generally taken to be fixed,
while the energy charge varies with the amount of energy consumed. .

.

.When such fixed charges are subtracted, the result is

an appropriate proxy for a utility's avoided cost."' 4' The MPUC
adopted the amendments based upon the administrative law
42
judge's finding.
Arguably, the administrative law judge failed to take marginal
cost factors and the impact of averaging into account in his assumption that the payment of purchase rates derived from the full
retail rate schedule would exceed "full avoided cost." Nevertheless, the net energy billing rates derived under the MPUC definitions and the amended rules may be workable and provide a test
to determine whether the rates will provide sufficient financial incentive to encourage small power production.
B.

Uthy Interconnection TariffFziings

The MPUC rules require electric utilities43 to file an annual

44
cogeneration and small power production interconnection tariff.

Future QF owners should be aware of information included in the
40. 1984 Report of Administrative Law Judge, supra note 15, at 6-10; see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 53 U.S.L.W. 2251, 2252 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct.
25, 1984) (PURPA does not preempt state statute which requires utilities to purchase
power at a rate that exceeds maximum rate under PURPA).
41. 1984 Report of Administrative Law Judge, supra note 15, at 9.
42. 1984 Order Adopting Amended Rules, supra note 15, at 3-13.
43. Municipal utilities are covered by the MPUC rules, MINN. R. pt. 7835.0100,
subp. 24(A), and may remain self-governing if consistent rules are adopted. Id.pt.
7835.0100, subp. 24(B). Most municipal utilities' rules incorporate the subject matter required in utility tariff filings. Thus far, a few municipal utilities have accepted the MPUC
rules. The authors' review of filings with the MPUC in late July, 1984, prior to the recently adopted rules, indicates that many municipals filed tariffs. Most municipals stated
in their filings that they are not presently connected with any QFs, and therefore will
comply with the rules when and if they become interconnected.
44. MINN. R. pt. 7835.0300 (Supp. 1984). A tariff is a listing or scale of rates or
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tariff. Utilities file tariffs without notice to the QF or prospective
owners.
The tariff contains detailed information relating to utility interconnection rules. The tariff must include schedules determining
the purchase rates for power from the QF. This schedule includes
a showing of the average retail utility energy rate for net energy
billing purposes, 4 5 and the utility's claimed avoided cost data 46 for
other methods of billing. 47 The tariff must also set forth the utility's interconnection requirements, including safety standards, required operating procedures, functions to be performed by control
and protective apparatus, and the information that the utility
must provide to both prospective and existing QFs.48
Inherent difficulties exist in the use of tariff filings which in effect expand the requirements QFs must meet to comply with the
MPUC rules. First, no public or evidentiary hearings occur before
the interconnection tariff takes effect. Utilities file the interconnection tariff with the commission without notice to QFs or pro49
spective QFs under the procedural MPUC rules.
Second, even if the MPUC rules did provide for public or evidentiary hearings, the complication and cost for the QF or prospective QF to intervene in the interconnection tariff filing exceeds
the means of the normal QF under forty kilowatts. For example,
the cost of a good quality ten to seventeen kilowatt wind generator
is approximately $25,000 to $32,000.50 The investment of legal
and expert fees to question a particular utility filing would be out
of proportion to the amount invested by an individual small
owner. 5 '
Finally, future QF owners may not be present or even involved
at the time of the filing and effective date of the utility tariff. The
prospective owner thus will not realize the significance of vital interconnection tariff terms, or be cognizant of common interconnection problems. Few QFs are presently interconnected with
charges for a public utility. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2341
(3d ed. 1971).
45. MINN. R. pt. 7835.0650 (Supp. 1984).
46. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
47. MINN. R. pt. 7875.0600 (Supp. 1984).
48. Id pt. 7835.0800.
49. See MINN. R. pt. 7835.0300 (1983).
50. Hamilton, supra note 4, at 437.
51. Cf American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1921,
1932 (1983) ("The average cost to FERC of a contested interconnection proceeding is
currently more than $57,000 . . .
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utilities, 52 yet the tariff filing is most significant to future QFs because it governs interconnection.
Public regulatory agencies must review tariff filings before the
tariff is accepted and placed in effect. The reviewing agency
should, in part, act as a proxy for prospective QF owners who may
be affected by the tariff. The Minnesota Department of Public
Service has conducted such a review. 53 The department has also
informally requested comments concerning its review procedure
and meetings or hearings with utility and industry representatives
are anticipated. 54 Presumably, the department will promulgate
guidelines requiring a consistent format for tariff filings. Unfortunately, in the meantime QFs and prospective QFs face tariff filings
and interconnection requirements which represent the unilateral
position of the utility involved.
C

Qualing Facility Interconnection Plans

The MPUC rules permit the utility to require the QF to apply
in advance for interconnection and furnish an interconnection
plan. 55 The result is that QFs must incur additional delay and
costs in order to meet these administrative demands. If a utility
requires an interconnection plan, the plan may include only the
technical specifications of the cogeneration or small power production equipment, a proposed date of interconnection, and projection of net output or consumption by the QF "when available. ' '56
The utilities maintain that the interconnection application assures
that the QF follows proper technical and safety procedures before
52. This observation of the authors is based on a review of all tariff filings with the
MPUC in late July, 1984.
53. The Minnesota Department of Public Service studied the tariff filings of several
utilities. Summary of Department of Public Safety Review Schedules C, D & E Submittals by Qualifying Cogeneration Facilities to Public Utilities Commission (Discussion
Draft, undated) [hereinafter cited as Summary of DPS Review]. This study reflects concerns of the Department of Public Safety concerning compliance and problems with tariff
filing requirements. The study is based on a review of the tariff filings of the approximately 175 utilities operating in Minnesota, and is "presented to show specific concerns of
the Department and emphasize the need for a higher percentage of provisions expressed in
common language among the utilities." Id at 2.
54. Letter of Barry Payne, Energy Section Supervisor, Minnesota Department of
Public Service (Aug. 17, 1984).
55. MINN. R. pts. 7835.2900, .4800 (1983). The utility may require the interconnection plan from the QF not more than 30 days before interconnection. Id pt. 7835.4800.
56. Id pt. 7835.2900. No other information may be required. Id
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beginning service and operation in parallel with the utility
system. 57
The MPUC rules, however, fail to prescribe the time the utility
has to respond to the interconnection plan, or to delineate the extent of the technical information the utility may demand. Furthermore, the required plan discriminates against small energy
producers. QFs coming on line affect the utility little more than
an ordinary customer adding load to the utility system. Requiring
an interconnection plan is therefore unnecessary and discriminatory because similar plans are not required of those ordinary
customers.
Finally, the delay, complication, and expense presented by the
interconnection plan may discourage interconnection of small
QFs. As a practical matter, however, absent MPUC rules establishing application requirements, the QF owner need only object if
the utility is excessive or unreasonable in its application demands.
D.

Interconnection Costs

The MPUC rules, consistent with the FERC rules, require the
QF to pay net costs incurred in the interconnection. 58 This is a
major concern for QFs because costly or unreasonable utility
charges discourage alternative energy production. 9 Net costs are
those in excess of costs otherwise incurred by the utility in providing power service to the same class of customer in the absence of
interconnection. 60 The term "interconnection costs" means the
"reasonable costs of connection, switching, metering, transmission,
distribution, safety provisions, and administrative costs incurred
by the utility that are directly related to installing and maintaining the physical facilities and necessary to permit interconnected
operations with a qualifying facility. ' ' 6 1 Unless the utility and the
QF agree to other arrangements, payment must be made at the
57. See Mar. 1983 Order Adopting Rules, supra note 15, at 73-74.
58. Compare MINN. R. pt. 7835.2500 (1983) wit/h 18 C.F.R. § 292.306 (1984). QFs are
responsible for installing any equipment necessary for operating procedures required for
interconnection. MINN. R. pts. 7835.0800, .2200 (1983). The Minnesota rule has direct
statutory authority. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 8(b) (Supp. 1983).
59. The Minnesota Department of Public Service recognizes this concern. Cf Summary of DPS Review, supra note 53, at 2. There are over 175 various utility interconnection provisions with which QFs must deal. Id. "This presents a significant amount of
confusion to the QF and cogeneration industry which could actually discourage cogeneration." Id.
60. MINN. R. pt. 7835.0100, subp. 12 (1983).
61. Id
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time the costs are incurred by the utility. 6 2
QF owners object to paying interconnection costs because utilities may charge for unnecessary equipment, engineering, or administrative services. 63 Utility charges must be reasonable and
relate directly to interconnection. 64 Unfortunately, the rules pro-

vide little direction as to what is reasonable and necessary. In addition, the tariff filings largely leave the determination of
interconnection costs to be made by the utilities on a case-by-case
basis, whereas uniform provisions are superior when dealing with a
"single basic need. ' '65

E

Written Contract

Each QF seeking interconnection must enter into a written contract with a utility. 66 The rules specify the form of the uniform

statewide contract for under-forty kilowatt QFs. 6 7 The contract
details the commitment of the QF to sell power to the utility and
the obligation of the utility to buy under a purchase rate selected
by the

QF. 68

The MPUC rules give the basic form of the contract,

yet permit considerable variety. The utility may incorporate its
unique technical and engineering requirements, operating standards, and guidelines by reference. In addition, the purchase rates
and interconnection costs remain distinctive to each utility. The
MPUC rules require, however, that the QFs meet the technical
62. Id pt. 7835.2500.
63. See supra note 59.
64. PURPA and its regulations provide that the interconnection costs shall be nondiscriminatory. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(2) (1983); 16 C.F.R. § 292.306 (1984). The Minnesota
regulation requires that the costs be reasonable. MINN. R. pt. 7835.0100, subp. 12 (1983).
The inclusion of the provision that "costs are considered interconnection costs only to the
extent that they exceed the costs the utility would incur in selling electricity to the QF as a
nongenerating customer," Id.pt. 7835.0100, subp. 12 (Supp. 1984), serves the purpose of
making the rule nondiscriminatory. See supra note 14.
65. Summary of DPS Review, supra note 53, at 2-3.
66. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 6 (Supp. 1983); MINN. R. pt. 7835.2000 (1983).
The 1983 amendment to the MCSPPA requires the MPUC to formulate a "uniform statewide contract" for use in the interconnection of under-40 kW QFs. Act of June 8, 1983,
ch. 301, § 169, 1983 MINN. LAWS 1679 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 216B.164, subd. 6). This
requirement is now reflected in the 1984 MPUC rdles. MINN. R. pt. 7835.9910 (Supp.
1984).
67. MINN. R. pt. 7835.9910 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
2 (Supp. 1984). The filed rate schedule is
68. See id.pt. 7835.9910, Agreements
included as a part of the contract. Id The net energy billing rate will be selected by most,
if not all, QFs. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text. In addition, the QF may
elect either simultaneous purchase and sale or time-of-day purchase rates. The time-ofday rates are based on utility avoided cost determinations. See MINN. R. pt. 7835.3500
(1983).
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and operating standards for interconnection which the utility has
set, as permitted by the rules. 69 The uniform contract also incorporates the requirement that utility terms must be reasonable in
their technical and operating specifications for the QF. 7°

Several

significant contract provisions, derived from other rules, deserve
further comment.

1

Safety Code Provisions

The interconnecting QF must comply with the National Elec-

7
tric Code (NEC), 7 1 the National Electrical Safety Code (NESC), 2

and all other applicable laws, codes, and ordinances. 73 The NEC
basically applies to QF equipment and all other lines and facilities
on the QF side of the meter. From the meter to connection with
the utility system, the NESC governs.74 Other laws, codes, and
ordinances include local building and zoning codes and any applicable state board of electricity requirements which extend beyond
the requirements of the NEC.
These requirements create practical difficulty in some of the
utility tariff filings. A number of utilities require that certificates
of inspection, confirming compliance with all laws, codes, and ordinances, be delivered by the QF to the utility. These certificates
may be impossible to furnish. Local electrical inspectors often inspect only for compliance with the NEC. No systematic government inspection presently checks for compliance with the NESC.
69. MINN. R. pt. 7835.9910, Recitals (Supp. 1984). Seegeneraly Hamilton, supra note
4, at 433-47.
70. See MINN. R. pt. 7835.9910, Agreements $ 5 (Supp. 1984). The requirement that
technical and operating standards be reasonable and therefore nondiscriminatory arises
from general state and federal statutory language. See 16 U.S.C. § 2611 (1982); MINN.
STAT. § 216B. 164, subd. 1 (1982).
71. MINN. R. pts. 7835.6100, .9100, Agreements
7 (Supp. 1984). Paragraph 7 requires the QF to comply with national, state, and local electric and safety codes of the
state board of electricity maintaining jurisdiction over QFs. See MINN. STAT. §§ 326.241,
.243 (1982 & Supp. 1983); MINN. R. pt. 1315.0200, subp. 1 (1983); Mar. 1983 Order
Adopting Temporary Rules, supra note 15, at 38. "The Commission notes that the Minnesota State Board of Electricity has asserted its jurisdiction over safe wiring of qualifying
facilities." Id.
The NEC is adopted, with minor variations, by statute and regulation. MINN. STAT.
§ 326.243 (1982); MINN. R. pt. 1315.0200 (1983). The State Board of Electricity enforces
the NEC. See id
72. See Summary of DPS Review, supra note 53, at 4.
73. See, e.g., MINN. R. pts. 7835.6100, .9910, Agreements
7 (Supp. 1984).
74. But see Summary of DPS Review, supra note 53, at 2-3. "There is no clear provision, consistent among all utilities, for code and inspection requirements. Several require
approvals of non-existent entities." Id at 2.
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Inspection certificates may be unavailable, particularly in rural
agricultural areas, for compliance with building code and zoning
requirements. The QF owner must be alert at the outset of the
interconnection negotiation and question the excess nature of any
inspection or certificate requirement imposed by the utility.
2. Mantenance, Inspection, and Repair
The MPUC rules require that the QF bear the burden of furnishing, installing, operating, and maintaining in good order and
repair all apparatus needed for the proper operation of the QF
and its interconnection with the utility. 75 On its face, this require-

ment appears reasonable, but, relying on this provision, some utilities interject two further requirements for QFs in their tariff filings.
First, the utility may assert that larger transformers or other utility
equipment are needed because of the particular QF's configuration. 76 QFs vehemently oppose this assertion since under-forty kilowatt QFs have a limited effect upon the utility system.
Second, some utilities demand access to the QF for inspection,
including access to portions of the property beyond the meters and
point of interconnection. 77 The uniform statewide contract form
and the MPUC rules require utility access only if the configuration of the facility prevents disconnection or testing from the utility side of the interconnection. 78 QFs assert that inspections inside
the meters at the point of interconnection are unnecessary and
subject sophisticated QF equipment to risk of damage by utility
personnel. In addition, the privacy rights of QF owners are needlessly violated. Since the utility's only concern is the electrical
characteristics of the power being delivered by the QF, the utility
need only analyze the power from the utility's side of the
interconnection.

79

3.

Liability Insurance

QFs should be aware that utilities may require insurance cover7 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
75. MINN. R. pts. 7835.2200, .9910, Agreements
76. See Mar. 1983 Order Adopting Rules, supra note 15, at 83; 1982 Report of Hearing
Examiner, supra note 20, at 63-64.
77. See Summary of DPS Review, supra note 53, at Matrix line III, A.
78. MINN. R. pts. 7835.5400, .9910, Agreements $ 9 (Supp. 1984).
79. Utilities need only determine whether the QF is the origin of the problem, not
what is causing the problem. Therefore, the utility should have the burden of showing
need to inspect inside the meter. Furthermore, such inspection should be conducted only
in cooperation with the QF.
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age,8 0 and may seek to require the QF to name the utility as an
additional insured. 8' Once again, the small QF is confronted with
costs that may eventually discourage cogeneration. The rules and
the interconnection contract permit the utility to require the QF
to maintain liability insurance with coverage limits of up to
$300,000.82 The QF may carry higher limits of coverage, but the

MPUC rules now prohibit utilities from mandating more than
$300,000.83

The MPUC rules set the $300,000 coverage level

based on testimony that such limits are normally available under
homeowners coverage without any significant premium increase.
No evidence was presented in the rules proceedings to suggest that
the utility could be added as an additional insured to homeowners
coverage.
The utility is concerned that the QF maintain adequate coverage to protect the utility against liability.8 4 The MPUC rules,

however, do not require that the utility be added as an additional
insured, or that the utility be provided a certificate of insurance,
notice of renewal, or amendment of insurance. To require that the
utility be named as an additional insured may disrupt the availability of coverage.8 5 Yet in some cases, utility efforts requiring certificates and notice provisions are a practical way to evidence
maintenance of insurance and may be acceptable if those requirements can be satisfied by the QF without additional charge.
4. Indemnity Agreements
Indemnity provisions, required by some utilities, raise concerns
for QFs similar to those raised by insurance clauses. The MPUC
rules preclude either party from requiring the execution of an indemnity or hold harmless agreement by the other.8 6 The MPUC
rules state that "nothing in this chapter affects the responsibility,
80. See, e.g., MINN. R. pt. 7835.9910, Agreements
12 (Supp. 1984).
81. See Summary of DPS Review, supra note 53, at Matrix line VIII, 1.1.
82. MINN. R. pts. 7835.2300, .9910, Agreements
12 (Supp. 1984).
83. Id. 1984 Order Adopting Amended Rules, supra note 15, at 39-40; see also 1984
Report of Administrative Law Judge, supra note 15, at 27, 93; Mar. 1983 Order Adopting Rules, supra note 15, at 39-43; 1982 Report of Hearing Examiner, supra note 20, at 3538.
84. See 1984 Order Adopting Amended Rules, supra note 15, at 39-40; 1984 Report of
Administrative Law Judge, supra note 15, at 28, $ 95; see also Mar. 1983 Order Adopting
Rules, supra note 15, at 39-43; 1982 Report of Hearing Examiner, supra note 20, at 35-38.
85. Some utilities' tariffs include this requirement. See Summary of DPS Review,
supra note 53, at Matrix line I, B4-7. The question remains whether naming the utility as
an additional insured may disrupt the QF's coverage.
86. See MINN. R. pt. 7835.2400 (1983).
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liability, or legal rights of the parties under applicable law or statutes."18 7 The rules also specifically require that the utility remain

responsible for its personnel when they enter upon QF property.,,
Notwithstanding these provisions, some utility tariff filings include QF liability clauses.a 9 The clauses state that the QF shall be
liable to the utility for any costs arising out of the interconnection,
regardless of the failures, neglect, or power characteristics of the
utility. 90 The alert QF owner should challenge these liability-shifting provisions, because the MPUC rules provide that the parties
retain their responsibilities, liabilities, and legal rights under applicable laws and statutes, and neither party may require contractual
relief from these obligations.
5.

System Emergencies

QFs should be aware that the electric utility may stop sales of
electric energy or capacity to the QF under certain circumstances.
The utility has the right to cease providing electricity to the QF
during system emergencies. 9' A system emergency encompasses a
condition on the utility's system which is likely to cause a "significant disruption of service to customers or to endanger life or property."'9 2 The utility may also cease purchasing from the QF, with
notice as specified in the contract, when necessary for construction,
inspection, repair, and installation of equipment or facilities. 93
Although the ramifications of the right of the utility to cease providing power to the QF are not yet known, the discontinuance of
94
service must not be discriminatory.
6.

Termination Notice

The uniform statewide contract allows either party to terminate
87. See id.
88. See id.pt. 7835.5400.
89. See Summary of DPS Review, supra note 53, at Matrix line VIII, P, Q, T, U, & V.
90. But cf Dakota Elec. Ass'n, Farmington, Minn., Cogeneration and Small Power
Prod., MPUC Schedule C, at 9, 2.4 (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Dakota Elec.
Ass'n Tariff]. "The Cooperative does not assume any responsibility for the safety and
electrical protection of the Member's facilities irrespective of the condition of the Cooperative's facilities. The Cooperative shall not be liable to the Member for any damage to the
Member's facility, including damage caused by disconnection of the QF from the Cooperative's system by automatic or manual devices or pursuant to the Safety and Operating
Standards." Id.
91. MINN. R. pt. 7835.2800 (1983).
92. Id pt. 7835.0100, subp. 15.
93. Id.pt. 7835.9910, Agreements
11.
94. Id.pt. 7835.2800.
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the contract on thirty days' notice.9 5 Yet the MPUC rules do not
specify what constitutes default. Thus, it appears that the contract
may be terminated at will by either party.
The MPUC rules also provide that contracts between QFs
under forty kilowatts and utilities already existing before the effec96
tive date of the new MPUC rules may be cancelled and replaced.
At the option of either party, the uniform contract may be substituted by giving the other party written notice. "The notice is effective upon the shortest period permitted under the existing
contract for termination, but not less than ten nor more than 30
days." '9 7 It may be argued that this provision unconstitutionally
impairs contract rights. 98 Yet, as the administrative law judge determined, "In the instant case, the legitimate policy justifying uniform contractual arrangements between small qualifying facilities
and utilities justifies the retroactive application of the rule to preexisting contracts." 99
F

Metering

Small QFs encounter further costs and uncertainty in undertaking to satisfy the MPUC rules' provisions on metering. Metering
by the utility is required for the utility to satisfy the reporting requirements of the rules.'0° The utility will provide the standard
meter, or its equivalent, for the measurement of utility service on
the same terms as applied to other customers. 10 The QF must pay
for a second meter as part of the interconnection costs.102
Some metering issues are unresolved. The uniform statewide
contract fails to specify the metering configuration. The utility is
entitled only to a metering, or determination from metering, of the
power delivered by the utility to the QF and the power delivered
95. Id pt. 7835.9910, Agreements
13.
96. Id pt. 7835.5900.
97. Id
98. See 1984 Order Adopting Amended Rules, supra note 15, at 25 (citing 1984 Report
of Adminstrative Law Judge, supra note 15, at 18-19). The opinions refer to the extensive
consideration of this issue in the 1982 rules hearing. See 1982 Report of Hearing Examiner, supra note 20, at 84-86.
99. 1984 Report of Administrative Law Judge, supra note 15, at 19.
100. MINN. R. pt. 7835.2700 (1983). Reporting requirements are detailed in Minnesota Rules pts. 7835.1300 to 7835.1800.
101. See id. pts. 7835.0800, .0100, subp. 12, .2200, .2500. This assumption is implicit in
the rules and law. A detailed description of the meter requirement does not exist. Therefore, just, fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory statutory standards should apply.
102. Id pt. 7835.2700.
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by the QF to the utility. 103
Different metering configurations, however, may provide the
same results. For example, a standard meter that runs in both directions reads the net power drawn or delivered by the QF. A
detent meter only reads in one direction. A detent meter reading
the power delivered by the QF to the utility provides sufficient
information in conjunction with the standard meter to determine
the power delivered by the utility to the QF. This configuration
also contains an advantage to the QF: it provides direct reading of
the net power delivered to or from the QF during a billing period
for net billing purposes. It also avoids the cost to the QF of either
acquiring a second detent meter which reads the power delivered
by the utility, or adding detent devices to the existing standard
meter.
Utilities dispute the accuracy of standard meters, particularly if
permitted to run in reverse. Utilities claim that more accurate information can be obtained by the installation of a detent meter to
read the power going to the QF from the utility, with a separate
detent meter to read the power being delivered by the QF to the
utility. Under normal circumstances, however, this type of meter
imposes additional expense upon the QF since most utility customers do not have a detent meter.' °4
Some utilities also assert that a third meter should be required
to read the maximum load being served to the QF, since that
power will not be represented in the reading of power either drawn
or delivered by the QF.105 The third meter represents additional
costs to the QF, while the intent of the reporting requirements is to
measure only utility and facility interaction.' 0 6 Any additional
metering should be at the expense of the utility because the addi0 7
tional meter does not serve the rules' purpose.1
G.

Lockable Disconnect

The QF has the responsibility of installing a lockable disconnect
which is accessible to the utility for the purpose of isolating the QF
from the utility system. 0 8 The MPUC rules do not require the QF
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
MPUC
108.

See id pts. 7835.1400, .2700.
See Summary of DPS Review, supra note 53, at 2.
Mar. 1983 Order Adopting Rules, supra note 15, at 47.
See MINN. R. pt. 7835.1400 (1983).
See id pt. 7835.0200 (such an act would be beyond the scope and purpose of the
rules).
See id pt. 7835.5200.
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to install an automatic disconnect, although this method of disconnection is the most immediate in the event the utility system ceases
to operate. This is in part due to the added cost of such a requirement, which does not necessarily result in increased safety. 10 9 A
few utilities in their tariff filings waive the requirement of a lockable manual disconnect when an acceptable automatic disconnect
exists.110 Applying the MPUC rules strictly, however, the utility
and QF must include the lockable manual disconnect even if they
determine that an automatic disconnect is preferable, or risk the
possibility that the absence of the lockable manual disconnect may
be a source of liability in the case of an accident.
The lockable disconnect must be accessible to and may be
locked by the utility. I ' A double-lock disconnect would be appropriate if the QF desires it,112 since the QF may desire to manually
disconnect.
H

Safety, Technical, and Operating Requirements

Small QFs may be placed at a disadvantage if the utility mandates excessive requirements concerning various safety standards.
The utility may prescribe and include in the contract safety, technical, and operating requirements, including conditions of service. t13 These prescriptions must be reasonable and related to
safety or to avoidance of adverse impact on other customers or the
utility service." t4 The preamble to the uniform contract makes it
clear that the utility rules, regulations, and policies imposed on the
QF under the uniform contract mean only those applicable to
109. Mar. 1983 Order Adopting Rules, supra note 15, at 77-80. For QFs possessing
only manual disconnects, in the view of the administrative law judge and the MPUC,
requiring automatic disconnects would present unreasonable and unnecessary costs because safety would not be significantly increased. Also, the QFs' generating apparatus
might be incapable of supporting an automatic disconnect. Id. at 79.
110. Dakota Elec. Ass'n Tariff, supra note 90, at 8-9.
111. See MINN. R. pt. 7835.5200 (1983).
112. The technical characteristics of the manual disconnect are also significant
although not precisely fixed by the MPUC rules. Some very expensive lockable disconnects are available with plexiglass doors which make the disconnect visible at all times.
Less expensive devices require the opening of non-transparent doors to view the disconnect. Obviously, the specification by a utility of the most expensive form of device may
discourage interconnection.
113. MINN R. pt. 7835.9910, Agreements 7 (the QF must "conform to the national,
state, and local electric and safety codes").
114. See MINN. STAT. § 216B.164(1) (Supp. 1984); MINN. R. pt. 7835.0200 (1983)
(must provide "maximum possible encouragement to cogeneration and small power production consistent with protection of the ratepayers and the public").
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technical standards for interconnection authorized by the
MPUC.1" 5
Utilities should be precluded from imposing the same technical
connection and operating requirements on small QFs as imposed
on larger facilities. Assuming that under-forty kilowatt QFs have
little or no impact on, and present little or no hazard to, the utility
system, the burdensome requirements applied to larger QFs
should not be thrust on small QFs. While the Department of Public Service has reviewed utility filings, " 6 each QF owner must itself
challenge unreasonable technical, safety, and operating requirements. All technical and operational requirements must, however,
be viewed in light of the MPUC rules with respect to maintaining
power output, 117 varying voltage levels, 11 safety, 19 separate distribution transformer, 120 and limiting capacity of single-phase
2
generators.' '
The MPUC rules also require that notice of the proposed interconnection be given to telephone utilities and cable television
firms,12 2 and that access by the utility for testing be allowed with
respect to effects of interconnection upon those communications
companies. 23 This notice is necessary so that coordinated analysis
and testing may be conducted. 24 If a communications facility
challenges a QF, the law and rules fail to specify the extent to
which the communications facilities have standing to require a QF
to prevent an effect on communications. As a practical matter, the
impact upon the communications industry of small QFs is
negligible.
III.

CONCLUSION

Before formulation and enactment of new state agency rules,
115. MINN. R. pt. 7835.9910, Recitals (1983 & Supp. 1984).
116. Eg., Summary of DPS Review, supra note 53.
117. MINN. R. pt. 7835.5500 (1983) (frequency and voltage must be compatible with
normal utility service).
118. Id pt. 7835.5600 (must not "adversely affect the service or equipment of other
customers").
119. Id pt. 7835.5700 ("must adhere to all applicable national, state, and local codes").
120. Id pt. 7835.5000 (required only if necessary to protect employees' or public's
safety or to keep service within regulated limits).
121. 1d pt. 7835.5100 (required only if necessary "to avoid the likelihood that a qualifying facility will cause problems with the service of other customers").
122. Id. pt. 7835.4900 ("notification must be as early as practicable to permit coordinated analysis and testing before interconnection, if considered necessary")
123. Id pts. 7835.4900, .5400.
124. Id pt. 7835.4900.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 6
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I1I

utilities enjoyed a superior bargaining position in dealing with
Minnesota cogenerators and small power production facilities.
The Minnesota legislation and MPUC rules now grant liberal exemptions from public utility requlations for the interconnection of
QFs under forty kilowatts. QF owners may now better appraise
what is involved in interconnection of a small facility to a utility,
as compared to those larger cogenerators which are dependent on
negotiation of a contract and determination of avoided costs.
While the rules primarily protect and encourage the development of alternative energy sources, significant disputes may still
arise in the interconnection setting. The primary points remaining
for final resolution concern the exact technical and operating standards to be imposed by the utilities on QFs. These differences may
be resolved by the accumulation of technical experience as more
QFs come into existence. In addition, utilities must make reasonable demands of QFs so that the development of alternative energy sources is given the maximum possible encouragement.
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